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ABSTRACT
Algorithmic (including AI/ML) decision-making artifacts are an
established and growing part of our decision-making ecosystem.
They are now indispensable tools that help us manage the flood of
information we use to try to make effective decisions in a complex
world. The current literature is full of examples of how individual
artifacts violate societal norms and expectations (e.g. violations
of fairness, privacy, or safety norms). Against this backdrop, this
discussion highlights an under-emphasized perspective in the body
of research focused on assessing valuemisalignment in AI-equipped
sociotechnical systems. The research on value misalignment so far
has a strong focus on the behavior of individual tech artifacts. This
discussion argues for a more structured systems-level approach
for assessing value-alignment in sociotechnical systems. We rely
primarily on the research on fairness to make our arguments more
concrete. And we use the opportunity to highlight how adopting
a system perspective improves our ability to explain and address
valuemisalignments better. Our discussion endswith an exploration
of priority questions that demand attention if we are to assure the
value alignment of whole systems, not just individual artifacts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics→ Technology audits; Socio-
technical systems; Systems analysis and design; • Computing
methodologies→ Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artifi-
cial intelligence; Systems theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Issues around bias in AI/ML and algorithmic artifacts are now
common knowledge. There is a significant body of research demon-
strating examples of algorithmic bias, its causes, and its features.
Typical discussions of biases inherent in AI/ML artifacts include ex-
aminations of bias in facial recognition models [5], natural language
processing models [7], and risk-estimation tools [1].
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Algorithmic bias fits into a larger body of concerns dealing with
the integration and performance of technology artifacts in society.
The problem of value alignment [2, 15, 22] captures this larger
body of concerns: how can we design systems that achieve their
specific objectives while remaining aligned with the broader values
of society? The values implicated can include fairness, privacy,
safety, trustworthiness, etc. The value alignment frame is useful
because it primes us to think about the portfolio of values we hope
to induce in our artifacts, as opposed to having an exclusionary
focus on single values. This also helps us better appreciate the
tensions between norms e.g. how do we balance the elevated data
privacy risks in minority sub-demographics against the need for
more minority data samples for training fairer ML models?
Much of alignment-related research tends to focus narrowly
on the nature of the technology artifacts and their specific value
alignment pathologies. Efforts like the MIT Moral Machine [3] use
crowdsourcing to elicit moral intuitions in isolated artifacts in con-
trived scenarios, completely stripped of the systemic perspective.
Other researchers have developed sophisticated learning mecha-
nisms (e.g. inverse reinforcement learning models) [10, 13] to do
more than just elicit moral intuitions and try to actually induce
value alignment in individual intelligent artifacts.
In contrast to these efforts, this discussion aims to draw out
the implications of the fact that no technology artifact exists in
a vacuum; each artifact (including AI/ML models) fulfills at least
one role within a complex sociotechnical system1. Individual arti-
facts can have complex nonlinear interactions with the rest of the
sociotechnical system. They can have hard-to-predict influences
on the system’s overall performance. So even normatively perfect
artifacts are not guaranteed to result in a normatively perfect sys-
tem e.g. the rate of human overrides observed by Chouldechova
et al. [8] after the introduction of an improved AFST tool. There
are many other ways in which the use of seemingly innocuous
algorithms will be unjust in practice. Our discussion is grounded
primarily in work on fairness audits as this was the domain that
informed our thinking [18]. Other relevant values for this kind of
analysis include privacy, and security.
Achieving value alignment in decision systems will require a
broader systems-level focus in our research and implementation
efforts. And the importance of system-level value alignment au-
dits will likely only grow as complex algorithmic decision-making
artifacts become a more established part of our decision-making
ecosystem. Audits of individual artifacts will continue to be impor-
tant insofar as they provide details for a more complete characteri-
zation of how decisions propagate in systems. But perfectly aligned
1 We use the term sociotechnical system (STS) to refer aggregate systems that involve
complex interactions among human agents, technology artifacts, and the environment
around both [4]. For simplicity, we will focus most of our discussion on mission-
oriented STSs within an institution e.g. a population of people working with diverse
pieces of technologies within the criminal justice institution.
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individual artifacts are not the goal; a fair or just sociotechnical
system is the goal.
2 A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE IN PRACTICE?
An important starting point for auditing value alignment in STSs
is identifying the structural map of the STS. Eliciting the exact
structure of interactions in an STS can be difficult. The goal is to
gain a useful understanding of the structure of decisionmaking
in that system. So precision and fine detail may not be necessary.
Understanding this structure can help explain or diagnose observed
systemic problems.
In practice, we have framed this elicitation as the identification
of simplified decision pipelines in an STS (e.g. in a criminal justice
system, employee recruitment or promotion system, etc.). Deci-
sion pipelines are construed as collections of connected chains of
decision-making points in an institution (‘nodes’). Alternatively, de-
cision pipeline can be construed as paths in an institution through
which decision outcomes propagate (‘edges’). The true complete
structure of a typical STS is likely very complex and densely net-
worked.
There are many advantages to this mapping exercise, not all of
which need to be related to value alignment. For example, system
decision maps can help:
(1) IdentifyingOpportunities forAutomatedDecisions: Iden-
tify decision points at which algorithmic decision aids may
be usefully applied or are already applied. The eligibility
criteria generally includes: the existence of a well-defined
decision goal, the existence of significant measurable data
for training ML models, & the risks and costs associated with
incorrect decisions.
(2) Performance tracking: Validating whole-system perfor-
mance will generally involve validating the system’s sub-
parts. Identifying the key sub-processes will facilitate this
system validation effort.
(3) Accountability&Explanation: Decision systemmaps help
focus efforts to debug failures. Credit assignment, the ability
to assign credit or blame to sub-parts of a system for observed
overall errors or success, is a famously central function for
effective system adaptation and optimization [16]. Credit
assignment is only possible if the structure of the decision
system is, at least, roughly identified.
(4) Intervention Planning: Decision maps also enable better
planning for corrective or restorative interventions when
value misalignments are in progress.
The next subsection walks through a basic sample of one such
decision map developed in the course of another exercise. It is also
instrumental for framing the one benefit of the systems perspective
we discuss later in this paper.
2.1 A Notional System Map: a US Criminal
Justice System
There is significant prior literature exploring the use of algorithms
at different phases of the criminal justice decision pipeline. Here we
will focus on using these discussions to identify and describe a few
different sub-phases of the criminal justice decision pipeline, partic-
ularly those inwhich there is precedent for the use of algorithmic de-
cision aids. For example, risk assessment tools are used to determine
pretrial detention decisions, sentencing, treatment/rehabilitation
for incarcerated offenders, and parole/probation decisions. These
tools were first used for probation decisions, then pretrial decisions,
and most recently for sentencing (including some sub-decisions
about treatment/rehabilitation while incarcerated). Some key parts
of this decision pipeline include (see Figure 1 for a stylized depiction
of the pipeline):
2.1.1 Pretrial detention. Risk-assessment tools are often used for
pre-trial detention and release decisions, and generally place more
focus on static risk factors in this context. One pre-trial tool, the
Public Safety Assessment (PSA), is use in three states (Arizona,
Kentucky, and New Jersey) and dozens of local jurisdictions in
other states. The PSA was developed by the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation. It was built using data from 1.5 million crimes across
300 U.S. jurisdictions in an attempt to help make decisions about
whether an individual should be detained or released before trial,
but not any other considerations (e.g., rehabilitation).
2.1.2 Sentencing. Sentencing decisions are made for convicted
defendants at this decision point. Virginia was the first state to
implement a recidivism risk assessment instrument for sentencing
decisions relatively recently in 1994 [20]. This instrument, created
by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, was designed to
divert 25% of the lowest-risk offenders to non-prison sanctions. In
1999, Virginia developed a second instrument; this time, the goal
was to identify the highest-risk offenders. High-risk sex offender-
sâĂŹ sentences could then be increased as much as threefold. In
Utah, while the judge maintains discretion in the final decision,
(s)he must consider both the sentencing guidelines for the offense
and the recommendation of the Office of Adult Probation and Pa-
role, which includes an assessment of risk and needs that accounts
for factors including education level, substance abuse, and home-
lessness.
2.1.3 Treatment/rehabilitation. Some states use algorithmic scores
similar to those mentioned in the sentencing section to assess which
“life skills” classes best meet the inmate’s needs and to determine
conditions of probation. Newly imprisoned inmates in Pennsylvania
are evaluated with the Risk Screening Tool to assess their risk
of recidivism, and are categorized into low, medium, and high-
risk groups. Medium and high-risk inmates may complete further
assessments and potentially complete a treatment plan addressing
their “criminogenic needs” before being considered for parole [17].
2.1.4 Parole/probation. Rudimentary algorithms used for probability-
based assessment long predate what we might consider the current
algorithmic boom. In the first half of the 20th century, Ernest W.
Burgess and others created expectancy tables for parole prediction,
which included factors such as work history, marital status, and
prison rule violations [6]. In the 1970s, the Salient Factor Score [14]
was first developed for use in federal parole guidelines; in that era,
it was considered unfair to include immutable characteristics (e.g.,
race, ethnicity, gender, and age) in parole and sentencing criteria. A
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Figure 1: Notional example of a decision pipeline within a sociotechnical system (a US criminal justice system).
1982 report also examined selective incapacitation, a probabilistic ap-
proach to prioritizing incarceration targets by stratifying criminal
risk [12].
Besides these uses, other modern decision points in the crimi-
nal justice pipeline include predictive policing, facial recognition,
probabilistic DNA and analysis [9].
3 THE FRUITS OF A SYSTEMS-LEVEL
FRAMING
The value of a systems perspective on value alignment is at least
two-fold: it has more explanatory power for the observed alignment
pathologies; & it gives us more tool and flexibility for correcting
alignment problems. We highlight the advantages with two exam-
ples: on feedback cycles and on an unexpected adaptation to the
introduction of algorithms.
(1) Algorithm overrides: Chouldechova et al. tells of an STS
pathology in a child welfare decision pipeline [8]. The team
developed and deployed an algorithmic decision-making
aid to flag high-risk cases in the child welfare system for
case workers. The model was certified to have accuracy im-
provements over the status quo. However case-workers were
overriding the models risk estimation decisions at a higher
than justified rate. The reasons for the overrides was still
under investigation at the time they published their results.
The example illustrates that focusing on the efficiency of
sub-parts of a decision-pipeline may be insufficient to im-
prove the value-alignment of the whole system. There are
impedance mismatches or transmission barriers as informa-
tion and decisions flow through an STS. This is especially
true when there agents in the STS (human or algorithmic)
have significant discretion in adapting to changes2. Whole-
system value alignment requires careful accounting for such
transition costs.
(2) Runaway feedback loops: A myopic examination of a
criminal justice decision pipelinemay predispose a researcher
to expect that as long as only perfectly fair algorithms are
introduced the overall system will operate fairly. But simu-
lation studies of criminal justice decision pipelines [11, 19]
show that seemingly innocuous and fair predictive polic-
ing algorithms based on discovered crime rates (the form
of data most easily available for training ML models) can
lead to runaway feedback loops in inequitable patterns of
criminalization (where equity is defined in terms of proba-
bility of discovery given crime commission). This particular
alignment pathology can be traced to dynamics earlier in
the decision pipeline, at the surveillance decision point (also
further back in time). A myopic focus on just current predic-
tive policing algorithms would be insufficient for under and
addressing this misalignment.
These documented issues make a strong case that researchers
and decision-makers need to adopt a systems perspective is they are
to be effective at adapting (or designing) value-aligned systems. And
this is true regardless of what value, theory of justice, or philosophy
the practitioner brings to the table.
3.1 Priority Research Questions
A systems-level perspective is just a first step. Research programs
based on this perspective (ours included) often still revert to just
using system decision maps to identify individual algorithms worth
auditing. Making full effective use of this framing will require a
2The effects of such discretion or latitude are not necessarily normatively good or bad.
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few new tools in our methodological arsenal, a minimal selection
of which could include work on:
(1) CharacterizingDecisionTransitionCosts: there can some-
times be barriers to the transmission of decisions at interfaces
betweenAI/ML and human decision agents in a system (what
we called Impedance Mismatches earlier). The reasons for
such barriers can include: lack of trust in the technology, cul-
tural aversion, the practice of human discretion, explanatory
gaps (e.g. when the model is opaque), etc. There are already
bodies of research on some of these concerns. Translating
these types of work to better characterize and understand
pathologies in sociotechnical decision systems could be en-
lightening.
(2) Complex Adaptive Models of STS: STSs are comprised of
adaptive human agents/organizations and relatively static
artifacts. Such a complex adaptive systems (CASs) can ex-
hibit hard-to-predict behaviors. We need principled tools
and methods for modeling and simulating the interaction of
human and artificial agents in these STSs. These approaches
will enable better diagnostics and situational awareness for
systems-level value-alignment issues.
(3) Designing AdvancedMechanisms for Redress or Com-
pensation and: The focus on single artifact performance
limits the range of possibilities for redress. There is a heav-
ier focus on just designing more advanced technologies to
overcome normative misalignment. This can be a myopic
response. A systems perspective allows for a broader range
of interventions e.g. robust oversight and compensation pro-
cedures built around imperfect artifacts.
(4) Statistical Learning Models of Regulation: The increas-
ing complexity of technology artifacts (including AI/ML
models) has placed significant strain on the ability of reg-
ulating agencies to constrain the adverse impacts of these
technologies. Current events routinely highlight this short-
fall in regulatory capacity e.g. Boeing safety crisis of 2019,
the financial crash of 2008, etc. There is a case for explor-
ing and introducing regulatory models based on statistical
learning theory and control theory, especially when the reg-
ulatory goal is focused on measurable outcomes and conse-
quences (as opposed to procedural norms) e.g. the regulator
only cares about safety or outcome fairness. Optimal regula-
tory schemes in such outcome-focused or consequentialist
“regulatory games” can be modeled as reinforcement learn-
ing problems or optimal control theory (Figure 2) i.e. what
optimal policies can a regulator learn to achieve a desired
observable outcome in a population of agents?
(5) ValueAlignment inMulti-stakeholder STSs: An implicit
assumption in much of the work on value alignment is that
the controlling value exists and is discoverable. But recent
work is beginning to highlight problems with this fram-
ing [18]. First, the assumption of a universal prescriptive
controlling value for an application is very much in direct
opposition with most practical experience with ethical deci-
sionmaking. Second, even if such a value exists, there is no
guarantee that all relevant stakeholders agree on the same
controlling value(s) for an application. Resolving this con-
flict in a multi-stakeholder application requires resorting to
preference aggregation mechanisms. There is already some
sophisticated work on preference aggregation (e.g. [10, 21]).
There is less work targeting the elicitation of truthful prefer-
ences. And far less work on the computational mechanisms
for robustly managing the process of compromise in prefer-
ences as is commonly observed in participatory modeling of
stakeholder norms.
Figure 2: Illustration of the interaction between free actor
and governing regulator agents in an outcome-focused reg-
ulatory game. The regulator agent observes state informa-
tion relevant to their regulatory mandate (in this case fair-
ness). While the actor agent pursues its goals subject to its
internal efficient mandate. Regulators may take actions to
impose costs or rewards on the actors to incentivize value-
aligned behavior in the population of actors.
4 CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper calls for adopting a systems engineering
approach for carrying out research on AI value alignment problems.
The systems perspective has advantages over the focus to-date on
individual misbehaving AI/ML artifacts: it gives us more levers for
redressing imperfect individual AI/ML decision artifacts; it can help
us anticipate and think more clearly about mismatches that can
occur as we embed more AI/ML in human decision systems; and
it helps us anticipate and diagnose mechanisms that can lead to
adverse feedback cycles more clearly.
Moral values and norms have been central to this discussion and
its related research program. But the discussion is still agnostic to
which specific set of values are desirable to induce on STSs and their
constituent artifacts. This highlights an opportunity and a need for
more philosophy and anthropology research on broadly-acceptable
binding norms to induce on technology artifacts in pluralist soci-
eties.
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